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Synergistic Security: A Work System Case Study of the Target Breach
Abstract
Recent publicized security breaches can be used to evaluate information security programs. The processes and
procedures that allowed the event to occur can be examined in a case study and then be used to find methods
for future mitigation of risk. The Target security breach is used in this study to examine the organization’s
information security program using a macro-ergonomic model. This research posits that an information
security program should consider the work system design, based in macro-ergonomics, to help mitigate
information security risk to the organization and ensure an efficient and effective information security
program. Based on a seminal macro-ergonomic model, the Leavitt Diamond Model (1965), an information
security model was designed. The Synergistic Security Model can be used to examine relationships between
macro-ergonomic information system constructs. The relationships that occur between the structure of the
organization (policies, procedures, leadership, etc.), the people, the technology, and the tasks can have an
impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of an information security program. For the purpose of examining
these relationships, the Synergistic Security Model is divided into triads, consisting of: Triad 1: Information
Security Structure- Information Security Technology-People (Information Security Behavior); Triad 2:
Information Security Structure-Information Security Tasks-People (Information Security Behavior); Triad 3:
Information Security Tasks-Information Security Technology-People (Information Security Behavior); and
Triad 4: Information Security Tasks-Information Security Technology-Information Security Structure. This
paper will examine the relationships found in the Target data breach, reported in December 2013.
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SYNERGISTIC SECURITY: A WORK SYSTEM CASE 
STUDY OF THE TARGET BREACH 
1. Introduction 
Insider threats to organizational information systems are a significant security 
concern. Considerable damage to organizational information systems has occurred 
by insiders with legitimate access to the organization’s data and many executives 
report that organizational users are more likely to cause damage to the system than 
outsiders. (Carnegie Mellon CERT Program; CSO Magazine; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers & United States Secret Service, 2013). One means of 
causing this damage is when organizational employees can unknowingly allow 
outside hackers to gain access to sensitive information. Information system 
employees make decisions and organize their activities on a daily basis.  Their 
actions have the potential to affect the entire organization, positively or negatively. 
Hackers know employees are a potential weakness in the information security 
fortress. Because of the nature of the design of an organization and the work that 
must be done to make the business successful, information system users often face 
decisions between choosing to complete their job tasks efficiently and effectively 
or to follow information security controls. Previous research indicates that users 
will often circumvent information security controls when they are attempting to 
complete their job tasks (Dhillon, 2001; Nash & Greenwood, 2008; Stanton, Stam, 
Mastrangelo & Jolton, 2005).  This circumvention creates a substantial risk to the 
organization. Recent publicized information security breaches, such as the Target 
breach of December 2013, can be used to analyze the efficiency and effectiveness 
of an information security program. Forbes (Sept 8, 2014) indicated that Target 
experienced a cost of $148 million due to the breach.  
Research indicates that users will often choose to complete job tasks over 
choosing to follow information security controls (Albrechtsen, 2007; Besnard & 
Arief, 2004; Post & Kagan, 2007).  As users complete their work, they will 
determine their goals and values, which in turn will affect their actions and 
behaviors (Beautement, Sasse & Wonham, 2008; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; 
Hedstrom, Kolkowska, Karlssom & Allen, 2011). This situation is a trade-off 
where users are making a choice between “right versus right” (Badaracco, 1993).   
Organizational goals are focused on productivity and to minimize costs. 
Information security goals focus on protecting the information systems and often 
do not examine the effect that the security program has on the user’s task 
completion. At the same time, organizational leaders consider the information 
security program a cost to the organization and therefore leaders often look for ways 
to cut those costs. The organization’s employees struggle to find the right direction 
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and the correct choices. This struggle is caused by a disharmony between the 
different constructs of a macro-ergonomic system. Creating harmony between these 
constructs can assist organizations with creating an efficient and effective 
information security program. The macro-ergonomic model, Synergistic Security 
Model, can be used to assist researchers and practitioners in examining areas of the 
information system program that have disharmony and therefore cause the program 
to be inefficient and ineffective. This research will gain insight into factors that 
contribute to poor information security decisions and assist in shedding some light 
on possible solutions to the issue. 
2. Literature Review 
There has been significant research on information security policy and procedure 
compliance (Albrechtsen, 2007; Besnard & Arief, 2004; Ifinedo, 2012; Kraemer & 
Carayon, 2007; Post & Kagan, 2007; Siponen, Mahmood & Pahnila, 2009, 
Siponen, Pahnila & Mahmood, 2014; Stanton et al., 2005). Additionally, previous 
research has indicated that information security can interfere with user job tasks 
(Post & Kagan, 2007; Ruighaver, Maynard & Chang, 2007). Information security 
must be a balance between data access for the authorized users and ensuring the 
protection of the data. Organizations need to understand the impact of information 
security programs on employees. Organizations should consider the relationship 
information security has on all of the basic systems within the organization. 
Information security leaders can examine this relationship between the constructs 
of the work system to minimize the pressure on employees to disregard security 
requirements.  When organizations implement information security within an 
organization, the relationships between the structure, technology, people and tasks 
will be impacted. Disharmony between these constructs will impact human 
behavior and can cause them to make poor choices. For example, employees may 
choose to complete a job task over following information security controls. 
Previous research has considered the human behavior aspect to understand 
user’s non-malicious circumvention of information security controls. For example, 
one study examined how people viewed their security related risks using threat 
assessments and another study examined user wants or needs, such as convenience 
(West, 2008; Workman, Bommer & Straub, 2008).    Still other studies related to 
human behavior included habit, protection motivation theory (PMT), knowledge, 
training, or skills (Leach, 2003; Vance, Siponen and Pahnila, 2012). However, these 
studies do not consider the all of the components of a work system. They only focus 
on the user or the people construct of the work system. Using a macro-ergonomic 
perspective can provide additional information on user behavior that may not be 
evident from a ‘user only’ perspective. 
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Previous research also considered organizational factors that could impact a 
user’s choice to circumvent information security controls. For example, one study 
indicated that the organizations should focus on attempting to influence the user 
behaviors and normative beliefs (Dhillon, 2001).  General Deterrence Theory was 
also examined as an organizational method for modifying user information security 
behavior (D’Arcy, Hovav & Galletta, 2009).  Research was conducted that 
considered the use of shaming within the organization to influence user information 
security behavior (Harris & Furnell, 2012). Yet another example of organizational 
influences on information security behavior is the establishment of an information 
security culture (Alfawaz, Nelson, Mohannak, 2010; De Veiga & Eloff, 2009; 
Vroom & von Solms, 2004).  While these studies considered the organizational 
perspective, they do not include all of the constructs of a work system design. For 
example, the Dhillon (2001) study aimed at user behavior and normative beliefs, 
but did not consider the impact of poorly designed policies or old and unreliable 
technology on employee security behavior. 
Usability of information security controls has been analyzed as an influence on 
user information security behavior. Often system developers do not focus on the 
usability of information security controls, but rather on the implementation of 
security requirements and the technical systems (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012). For 
example, users are sometimes required to remember dozens of passwords, work 
under a policy that prevents the passwords from being written down, and are not 
provided a technical solution to assist users with storing all of their passwords 
(Adams & Sasse, 1999). Of course, their job tasks require they must log into all of 
these systems. This situation provides the perfect setup for user circumvention of 
information security controls (circumvention of the policy that says they cannot 
write down passwords). Usability examines the relationship between the 
technology and the people, but does not consider the structure or task constructs 
that may also play a role in the behavior of the users. Perhaps the policy against 
writing down the passwords could be adjusted to say users can store the passwords 
in a secure manner, but cannot store them in an easily accessible location. Or 
perhaps the organization can purchase a password management system or use a 
single sign-on application. 
Little research considers the organizational view using socio-technical 
examination of user information security behavior.  The multiple password 
example could benefit from the socio-technical view, analyzing the impact of the 
security requirements using four constructs, human behavior, the tasks required, the 
structure of the organization (policies, processes and leadership) and the technology 
available.  One seminal macro-ergonomic model that can assist with this analysis 
is the Leavitt Diamond Model (Leavitt, 1965). The Leavitt Diamond Model 
contains the four constructs listed above:  People, Tasks, Structure, and 
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Technology. The Leavitt Diamond Model (1965), a work system design, will assist 
in the understanding of user information security behaviors. The socio-technical 
structure of work system designs can have a significant impact on user information 
security behavior. A work system that is not in harmony impacts employee behavior 
and causes them to circumvent information security requirements in the process of 
completing job tasks.  
3. Theoretical Model 
Previous information security studies have applied the macro-ergonomic 
perspective to information security (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Kraemer, Carayon 
& Clem, 2009). Factors in computer and information security vulnerabilities were 
studies conducted by Kraemer et al. (2009). Kleiner (2006) indicates that macro-
ergonomics is centered on making the organizational system work in a harmonious 
way. When the organizational system is working harmoniously, the organization 
will experience fewer problems, such as errors or violations because everything is 
working smoothly together. Macro-ergonomics is a mixture of two schools of 
thought. The first is the Classic school of thought with studies on supervision, 
hierarchy, reward systems, and span of control. The second school of thought is on 
Human Relations, which includes things like teams, motivation, and machine 
automation.  The balance between these two schools of thought is where the macro-
ergonomic perspective fits (Smith and Sainfort, 1989). This research posits that a 
harmonious work system for information security will result in fewer problems, 
such as errors and violations. 
The Leavitt Diamond model is a seminal theory within the macro-ergonomic 
school of thought (Leavitt, 1975). There are four components within the model: 
Structure, Technology, Task, and People. See Figure 1 for an illustration of the 
Leavitt Diamond research model.  Each component cannot be changed without an 
impact on the other three. For example, if a new technology were introduced into 
the organization, the other three constructs will adjust to the change. In some cases, 
the adjustment could have a negative impact on the organization and other times 
the change could be positive. When introducing a change, the organization needs 
to make sure the constructs of the work system are in harmony to ensure the work 
system is efficient and effective. Disharmony between the constructs will prevent 
the work system design from being as efficient or effective as it should be.  By 
examining the areas of disharmony between each of the constructs and making 
necessary changes to create harmony, the work system will then begin to adjust to 
a more efficient and effective state. 
The Leavitt Diamond model can be a basis to create a framework for examining 
the information security socio-technical work system. This research posits that the 
Leavitt Diamond model can be used to develop a macro-ergonomic model for 
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Information Security. This information security model is called The Synergistic 
Security Model, Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1: Leavitt Diamond Model (1965) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Synergistic Security Model 
The structure component of the model includes policies and procedures, as well 
as organizational relationships, workflow systems, or the systems of authority.  The 
technology component of the model would represent any problem solving 
inventions. The technology component could include anything from a pencil, to a 
word processor to an entire information system. The people component includes 
the attitudes of the people, their abilities, or their skills and understanding. The last 
component is the task component, which includes all of the things that must be 
completed to produce goods and services.  
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4. A Case Study 
A case study method is often used to examine “how” and “why” questions and 
provides the opportunity to analyze processes and procedures used in the course of 
completing a job task (Yin, 2012). The case study can also help to understand a 
phenomenon or to understand a particular situation or to understand interactions 
between information technology and other innovations (Darke, Shanks & 
Broadbent, 1998; Lee, 1989; Stake, 1995). Additionally, this research tested a 
theory for use in the implementation and management of information systems 
security.  The Target data breach of December 2013 was used as a case to examine 
the relationships between the constructs of the Synergistic Security Model. Target 
is the second largest United States discount retail chain (Trustmark National Bank 
and Green Bank, N.A. v Target Corporation and Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 2014). 
Target experienced a major data breach that was reported to the general public in 
December 2013. The loss of data occurred from November 27, 2013 through 
December 15, 2013 (Trustmark National Bank and Green Bank, N.A. v Target 
Corporation and Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 2014). The data collected on this data 
breach was used to create the case study for this research. Extensive publications 
were created about the Target data breach. These publications have detailed 
information that is readily available for review. Most recent data breaches did not 
have the extensive amount of detail available that the Target breach had. Therefore, 
the Target case could be examined through the lens of this research model.  
Each section of the model was divided into triads to allow a more narrow focus 
on the relationships. The researcher used online resources that included news 
reports, law suite records, the PCI Security Standards, and government reports 
regarding the December 2013 Target data breach. The research data was uploaded 
into qualitative data analysis software, Atlas.ti, where it could be coded, 
categorized, stored and analyzed. This allowed the researcher to look for patterns 
and to record relationships that developed between the data.  
Using Atlas.ti, the researcher coded the research documents as either 
“Structure”, “Technology”, “Task”, or “People”. Statements and quotes were coded 
according to where they fit within each of these categories and four families of 
codes were established based on the four constructs. A total of 92 codes were 
created. The researcher used the query tool to form groups of coded material, based 
on each of the Synergistic Security model triads. This allowed the researcher to 
analyze the data through each triad’s perspective. Additionally, the researcher used 
the search feature to find key words, such as “PCI-DSS” when reviewing the impact 
of specific constructs in relation to a triad.   
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4.1  The Case: A Summary Of The Target Data Breach 
While most of the collected data breach research indicated that Target was not PCI-
DSS compliant, Trustwise, Inc. had completed a security audit just weeks prior to 
the data security breach. This audit indicated Target was PCI-DSS compliant. The 
results of the Senate review on how the breach occurred indicated that an HVAC 
vendor was a victim of a phishing attack, causing a compromise to one of the logins 
used to access Target’s billing and invoice system (A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 
2013 Target Data Breach, 2013). Moving from the billing system, the attackers 
were then able to install malicious malware on the point of sale (POS) systems, 
where the credit card data was collected during sales and before data encryption 
occurred. Over time, the attackers were able to compromise a Target internal server 
and create a location to store the stolen POS data. Periodically, the internally stored 
stolen data was then transported to an external FTP server using another Target 
server. From there, the data was collected using a Russian-based server and a few 
other external data drop locations.  
5. Discussion Of Model Relationships 
Many of the construct relationships found in the data can fit into more than one 
triad. The constructs are very interrelated and different triad perspectives of the 
model can be used to examine the same situations. The triad allows the researcher 
to view the data from the various perspectives of the research model. For example, 
three of the triads discussed in this research include the impacts on behavior. 
Figure 3 indicates how the structure, task, and technology constructs can impact 
compliance behavior. Organizational leaders and the status of the work system 
design have the ability to place pressures on the employees. 
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Figure 3: Organizational and management influences and pressure outcome matrix 
Employees will react to these pressures in ways that leadership is often 
unaware. Kluge, Badura, Urbas and Burkolter (2010) examined how framing 
affects production within an organization. Subjects of the study could be “seduced 
to violate rules in a production setting when explicitly asked”. The study indicated 
that leaders must frame newly introduced safety rules as a gain for the company 
and for the employees to minimize vulnerability to violations (Kluge et al., 2010). 
Rules to safeguard information systems will be subject to the same vulnerabilities 
as rules that safeguard the physical welfare of employees. Management framing is 
an element of the structure construct in the Synergistic Security Model.  
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5.1 Triad Relationship: Structure – Technology – People 
 
Figure 4: The Information Security Structure – Information Security Technology – People 
(Information Security Behavior) 
The structure construct of the model is represented in the research data by 
examining the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI–DSS)(PCI-
DSS, 2013). Additionally, the structure construct includes the Target leadership 
goals and priorities. A review of the research data would indicate a possible lack of 
understanding for Target’s leadership for both the design of Target’s information 
system and the PCI-DSS standard. Target’s leadership trusted a third party vendor, 
Trustwise, Inc., to determine their compliance and Target appeared to rely on the 
results of the Trustwise audit as an indication that all was well with the information 
system (A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach, 2013). The 
disharmony between the structure component and the technology component can 
be examined by considering each of the PCI-DSS standards. 
One PCI-DSS standard states: install and maintain a firewall configuration to 
protect cardholder data. This standard addresses the requirement for Target to 
control unauthorized access. The unauthorized access took place in U.S. Target 
stores from November 27th through December 15th, 2013. Target had firewalls, but 
the firewalls were configured in such a way to allow the attackers to move freely 
through the network, both in and out, transporting protected cardholder data. 
Target’s external firewall configuration and architecture can be called into question. 
Additionally, internal firewalls could have assisted in the prevention of this attack 
by providing more effective segregation between the billing/invoice application, 
which the HVAC vendor employee used, and the POS systems that were infected 
with malware.  The technology and structure (policy) constructs are not in harmony; 
therefore employee behavior can be impacted. The IT staff was not following the 
required policies of PCI. Structure, in the form of leadership, did not ensure there 
were a sufficient number of skilled security professionals, who were trained and 
knowledgeable about protecting the network (Oltsik, 2014). With the lack of proper 
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firewall management, users have the ability to access unauthorized areas of the 
network or accidently introduce malware to the Target network. In this case, a user 
from an outside vendor was able to introduce malware into the Target network 
(Olstik, 2014). Target’s attackers gained access to the POS systems through a 
billing/invoice application.  
There was some network segregation to prevent the attackers from moving from 
the billing system to the POS systems, but the movement of the hacker was cloaked 
under a name used by the data center, thereby allowing the traffic to pass through 
the network undetected (Oltsik, 2014; Riley, Elgin, Lawrence & Matlack, 2014). A 
well designed network segregation would have limited the type of traffic that could 
move from the billing system to the POS systems. The lack of a well-designed 
network segregation that could prevent malicious traffic from moving from one 
system, the billing/invoice system, to the POS systems is a disharmony between the 
structure (policy) of the organization and the technology. Target leadership failed 
to ensure there was harmony between the structure of the organization (policies) 
and the configuration of firewalls (technology) of the organization. The lack of 
leadership’s concern over the harmony between the policies and the technology 
impacted the IT team’s behavior, which meant the correction of the issue was not 
addressed. This problem created a significant information security risk to Target 
and their information system. Examination of this triad relationship could have 
saved Target significant expense and public embarrassment. 
A PCI-DSS policy states to protect all systems against malware and regularly 
update anti-virus software or programs. Vulnerability scanning and patch 
management are needed to ensure the security of the information system remains 
at a maximum level. However, vulnerability scans and patch management can 
require that the system be unavailable for a period of time. If the leadership of 
Target did not consider the downtime for these activities of high enough priority, 
then these activities might not have been completed on a regular basis (Schwartz, 
2014).  Additionally, Target employees failed to install and update anti-malware on 
the POS systems. These systems were Microsoft desktop systems and should have 
been protected using anti-virus and anti-malware.  Role based access to the POS 
systems and the implementation of local firewalls combined, could have stopped 
the loss of the data. Because Target IT employees did not ensure these security 
controls were in place, the Target information system was very vulnerable to 
malware and was infected by the hackers. This was an indication that the structure 
(policies and leadership’s priorities) constructs were not in harmony with the 
technology (no anti-malware or role based access on the POS system and lack of 
downtime for scans and patching), which in turn affected the Target IT team’s 
behavior because they did not find it important to ensure all systems were kept up-
to-date and protected with these security controls. 
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PCI-DSS policy states organizations should develop and maintain secure 
systems and applications. Target data included stored PIN data, which is in 
violation of the PCI-DSS standard and indicates disharmony between the structure 
and technology constructs. By storing this data, Target provided a method by which 
attackers could make the possession of the stolen cardholder data useful. Once 
again, this situation provides an insight into the relationship between the structure 
and the technology components of the model. The policy does not allow the storage 
of this data. The Trustmark suit of Target and Trustwave (2014), indicate the Target 
leadership did not consider information security a priority, but rather the goals and 
objectives of the organization took priority, which would include the sale of 
merchandise to make a profit (Trustmark National Bank and Green Bank, N.A. v 
Target Corporation and Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 2014). 
PCI-DSS states that organizations must maintain a policy that addresses 
information security for all personnel. The contractual agreement between Target 
and the HVAC vendor can come into question here. There should be requirements 
for Target’s outside users when accessing the Target systems. Perhaps this indicates 
that organizations should ensure their vendors are implementing proper information 
security controls before a contract is signed. Vendor collaboration on information 
security could have assisted Target in the protection of the credit card information 
(A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach, 2013). Target leadership 
and security personnel were either not aware of or did not consider the importance 
of meeting this PCI-DSS standard. The leadership would be responsible for 
ensuring all contracts with vendors meet the organization’s information security 
requirements. The lack of concern from Target leadership with the management of 
the vendor employee’s access and ensuring their technology was meeting PCI-DSS 
requirement impacted the security team’s ability to protect the Target network. 
 It appears that Target’s leadership relied on a Trustwise Inc. vendor to ensure 
the protection of the information system.  Research of the data indicates that 
Target’s leadership lacked an emphasis to their employees about the criticality of 
information security controls. Leadership falls under the structure component of the 
research model.  The Target leadership indicated they were PCI-DSS compliant and 
they had the Trustwise, Inc audit to validate their beliefs, and yet the very design 
of the network would call that into question. This is a disharmony between the 
structure component and the technical component of the research model. Target 
deferred their information security responsibilities to a third party and then 
appeared to consider that sufficient to protect the information system. The 
disharmony would then affect the behaviors of the Target system users. The Target 
employees would have assumed the system was well protected, just as it appears 
their leadership had done. The Target employees would have assumed that no 
changes or additional work was required to ensure the information system’s 
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security. An additional consideration is that Target system users do not just include 
Target employees. The HVAC employee who initially compromised the system 
could be considered a Target system user, as well.  The need for harmony between 
the structure component and the technology component with the HVAC vendor is 
evident in that the initial infiltration into Target’s network environment began at 
this point. Some practitioners believe that the PCI-DSS standard is not sufficient 
for protecting sensitive information (Litan, 2014). While aiming to meet this 
specific standard through the use of a third party vendor, Target’s leadership failed 
to ensure that every aspect of the information system was as secure as possible 
while remaining usable for those who need to access the data. 
The review and improvement of the PCI-DSS standard (structure construct) and 
the requirements for updated credit cards with chips (technology construct) could 
have assisted in the mitigation of risk to the Target customers. Using the Synergistic 
Security Model could assist organizations in finding areas of the model that have 
room for improvement. Improvements to the banking standard, such as requiring 
companies to encrypt the card data while in transit, whether on the company’s 
internal network or on its way to a processor, would be an example of changing the 
structure of the model. A review would then be needed to determine the impact on 
the other constructs. Changing the technology used (chip cards instead of magnetic 
strips) could have had a significant impact on the results of the Target breach, 
saving the company their reputation, as well as their financial losses (Kitten, 2013; 
Liten, 2014). Updating this technology would have required a change to the 
structure construct in that a policy would need to require companies’ use of the new 
technology. Then, the tasks impacted and the behavior of the people would need to 
be examined to determine how the structure and technology construct changes 
affected these two constructs. 
5.2 Triad Relationship: Structure – Task – People 
 
 
Figure 5: The Information Security Structure- Information Security Task-People 
(Information Security Behavior) relationship 
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One of the very obvious situations in the Target data breach that provides an 
indication of the relationship between the structure, task, and people components 
of the model was the lack of the Target security team in providing sufficient 
monitoring for the information system. This is evident in that the new monitoring 
tool installed at Target just six months before the incident was providing multiple, 
high level alerts to the IT team. However, there was no response from Target’s 
employees (Riley, Elgin, Lawrence & Matlack, 2014).  The PCI-DSS standard 
requires the logs and firewalls to be monitored every day (PCI-DSS, 2013). A 
detailed monitoring of the alerts received by Target’s monitoring system would 
have provided sufficient details for the attack to be circumvented. However, the 
attack continued for 18 days (Acohido, 2013). To analyze the Structure – Task – 
Behavior relationship, several situations could be considered. If the new monitoring 
system was providing a significant number of false positive alarms, the team would 
have eventually ignored the alerts. This disharmony would cause the Target 
security team to fail to analyze the situation. If viewing the incident with a 
perspective that the Target security team did notice the alarms, then the team may 
have been unsure of the proper response to the alert. The lack of Target’s response 
to the alerts could be attributed to a disharmony between the structure (policies and 
procedures) and task components of the model. This lack of response indicates the 
information security team was not provided proper tasks, or processes, when placed 
in a situation they had not experienced before. The team would fail to behave in a 
required manner. Additionally, the lack of response could also indicate the Target 
team did not have sufficient training or skills to understand how the monitoring 
tools work or how the team was to analyze the alerts and logs when they saw a 
system alert. Since the monitoring system was fairly new, then the lack of response 
could indicate the Target security team was not sufficiently familiar with the tool 
to understand what the alert was indicating. The leadership should assist the team 
with processes and procedures that ensure the security team will monitor the 
information system as required and respond to alerts in a specific, organized 
manner. This disharmony was a significant factor in the success of the data breach 
attack. 
PCI-DSS requires the organization to regularly test security systems and 
processes. The impact of the Target data breach indicates the testing of the security 
systems and processes was very weak and the testing scenarios failed to consider 
all information security risks and vulnerabilities. Testing a system for 
vulnerabilities can affect system performance and, if not controlled well, can cause 
a system to go down. Additionally, testing systems and processes requires time and 
effort, an activity that Target may not have considered important enough to 
interrupt normal business. As suggested in the Trustmark lawsuit of Target and 
Trustwave, the Target leadership may have considered the operations of Target to 
have more priority than conducting information security tests (Trustmark National 
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Bank and Green Bank, N.A. v Target Corporation and Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 
2014). If the accusations Trustmark made in the lawsuit are accurate, it indicates 
disharmony between the structure and task constructs and it impacts the people 
(behavior) component of the research model. The leadership priorities (structure 
construct) and the relationship with the tasks required, impacted the IT employees 
behavior. 
A policy (Structure) from PCI-DSS states: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults 
for system password and other security parameters. The Target attackers were able 
to exploit a default BMC Software account name and password, meaning that the 
BMC Software system defaults were not renamed, which allowed the hackers to 
gain entry (Oltsik, 2014). Target indicated they met the PCI-DSS standards, but the 
technology was not configured in such a way to meet those standards. This is a 
disharmony between the structure and the technology components of the model. 
Structure (Policy) says they must rename the default password of the BMC 
software. However, in reality, the behavior of the IT team was to leave the default 
password as it was. The resulting behavior was that the Target employees did not 
follow the policy. Target employees followed leaderships premise that the 
Trustwise, Inc. PCI-DSS audit was an indication the information system was secure 
and there were not problems to investigate (A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013 
Target Data Breach, 2013). 
5.3 Triad Relationship: Task – Technology – People 
 
Figure 6: The Information Security Task- Information Security Technology- People 
(Information Security Behavior) relationship 
Segregation of the network was required according to the PCI-DSS standards (PCI-
DSS, 2013). These standards fall under the structure component of the research 
model. The technology component was to implement and configure firewalls and 
V-LANs and other network segregation practices to ensure the network would be 
secure.  The Task component of the network would include the assigned job tasks 
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that the Target security team should have been completing in order to ensure the 
network segregation was meeting sufficient levels.  Because of the successful 
nature of the Target data breach, it is very obvious that the relationship between 
these three components was inharmonious. Organizations should review their 
systems and ensure there is harmony between each area of the research model to 
ensure that the information security of the organization is being addressed and 
managed efficiently and effectively. Another data element to analyze for this 
research model triad is the warning the Target security team received from the 
Symantec Endpoint Protection (an antivirus system) that identified suspicious 
behavior on the server that was also identified by the monitoring system (A “Kill 
Chain” Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach, 2013; Riley, Elgin, Lawrence & 
Matlack, 2014). The PCI-DSS standard applies in this situation. The technology is 
Semantic software that was sending out warnings to the Target security team, yet 
the security team’s behavior was not sufficient to prevent the attack from 
continuing. The disharmony between the structure, which provided the policies and 
standards, the technology, which provided alerts, and the behavior of the technical 
team caused a serious situation to go un-noticed for a significant number of days. 
Target leadership relied on the Trustwise, Inc audit to ensure security controls were 
at a sufficient level.  
The POS data was stolen at the actual point of sale because of malware that was 
introduced by a user (Oltsik, 2014; Vijan, 2014). The user most likely fell for a 
phishing attempt or some other social-engineering event. Once the user logged onto 
the Target system while completing a job task, the hacker was then able to glean 
login and password information for access to the Target system. This fits the 
relationship between the task (where the user was completing a job task) and 
technology (where the user was using technology). It also appears that anti-malware 
may not have been active or up to date (technology). This can be coupled with the 
people construct where a lack of understanding or awareness of social engineering 
risks is evident. There was a disharmony in the information security model that 
allowed the malware to provide access to the Target hackers. 
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5.4 Triad Relationship: Task – Technology – Structure 
 
Figure 7: Information Security Task – Information Security Technology – Information 
Security Structure 
When considering the relationship between the triad components of task, 
technology and structure for Target’s data breach, the disharmony becomes very 
obvious.  The structure construct of the research model does not only address PCI-
DSS, but it also includes internal policies, procedures and processes that are 
expected from the employees. This construct will also include the leadership’s 
attitudes and values, organizational structures and any other organizational design 
that can influence the actions of the employees. As discussed earlier, the structure 
construct of the research model was not in harmony with the technology construct. 
While the required technology tools appears to have been purchased by Target, the 
implementation and configuration of these tools appears to have been lacking, 
creating exceptional risk for the Target information system. The relationship 
between the structure and task constructs was discussed earlier, as well. There was 
disharmony between these constructs because the required actions of the Target 
employees and the required processes, procedures and leadership appear to have 
been lacking. Last, the relationship between the tasks and technology was in 
disharmony as it appears that the Target employees were unsure of how to use or 
react with the security monitoring system when the alerts were provided. If the 
employees were properly trained, it is also a possible issue that the configuration of 
the monitoring tools could have needed to be adjusted to ensure alerts were not 
creating too many false positives. As mentioned earlier regarding the compromised 
server that stored the stolen data, the structure construct required the default login 
and password be changed, the technology existed that would easily allow this task 
to be completed, yet the task was never completed. The harmony between each of 
these areas was not there. If the employees had too little time, too little skills, or 
lack of knowledge, it was an issue that should have been recognized and addressed. 
The structure construct in the form of leadership should ensure the employees have 
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all of the knowledge, tools, and time needed to implement the security of the 
information system. Using the Synergistic Security Model to analyze the harmony 
of the security program could have assisted with the correction of some, if not all, 
of these issues. 
This triad examines the relationships between the information security tasks, 
the information security technology and the behavior of the employees.  The Target 
security team was not very familiar or comfortable with the new system and may 
not have developed a trust of that system, which would be a change that was 
introduced to the Synergistic Security Model. The Target security team may have 
experienced usability issues with the new monitoring tool. The relationship 
between the required tasks for Target’s security team and the new technology may 
not have been in harmony. While earlier analysis indicated that the PCI-DSS 
standard required consistent and reliable log and firewall monitoring, the task did 
not occur effectively. The new monitoring system was installed six months earlier, 
but the multiple alerts went completely unnoticed and were not responded to (Riley, 
Elgin, Lawrence & Matlack, 2014). This is not the only example of disharmony 
between the task, technology and structure constructs of the research model.  
A task that the Target leadership could have done to ensure the harmony 
between PCI-DSS compliance and the technology was to ensure all systems, 
including the POS systems, were protected with anti-virus software. The leadership 
should have ensured the tasks necessary for information security were completed 
by the employees, which most likely meant a requirement for training and planning 
for incidents to occur. Additionally, the POS systems could have been configured 
to disallow new applications (i.e. malware) to be installed without specific 
requirements. These data elements indicate a disharmony between task-technology- 
structure. Had the Leadership ensured all of the components of the research model 
were in harmony, the data breach may not have happened, or at least may not have 
been nearly as severe.  
6. Limitations 
Due to the fact that this research investigates sensitive data that has the potential to 
expose weaknesses and vulnerabilities of not only organizations, but also 
individuals involved, it is very difficult to obtain deeper information into the “why” 
and “how” the incident occurred. Some speculation based on actions of individuals 
and statements made by those involved and those conducting the investigations 
have to be employed.  
Obtaining the documents on the Target Data breach assisted with the analysis, 
but to have had access to those involved and obtain direct quotes would have been 
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of great benefit. The current research was limited to information that was publically 
available.  
Last, this was a single case study, which indicates that added case studies would 
shed additional light onto the impact of the Synergistic Security Model and would 
provide further evidence of the impact of harmony between the constructs. Further 
work needs to be conducted to investigate the impact of the Synergistic Security 
Model on the efficacy of an information security program.  
7. Conclusions 
The Synergistic Security Model is based on the seminal macro-ergonomic model, 
The Leavitt Diamond Model (1965). The analysis of the data from public sources 
indicated that poorly designed security work systems can impact the efficiency and 
effectiveness of an information security program. A well designed information 
security program should include constructs that work in harmony. Each of these 
constructs impact the other constructs. Therefore, when a change is made to any 
one of the constructs, an analysis of the impact of that change should be conducted. 
A thorough analysis could prevent information security incidents and assist the 
organization with establishing a well-designed information security program.  
Triads of the model were used to assist with the analysis. However, since a 
change of one construct can impact all other constructs, many of the discussed 
events fit into several different triads. For example, the fact that the security 
personnel at Target did not monitor the alerts from the FireEye Company and India 
could be the result of the leadership placing more emphasis on sales and less on 
security (Oltsik, 2014). However, this could also be the result of the employees not 
receiving sufficient training or it could be the result of the lack of sufficient staff 
(Oltsik, 2014). All situations can exist and each situation can fit into the information 
Synergistic Security Model, indicating an impact on the other constructs. 
The Synergistic Security Model can be used as a work system framework to 
ensure that all constructs of an information security program are in harmony. The 
harmony of these constructs creates a work system environment that helps 
researchers and practitioners understand the impact these constructs can have on 
the information system users. This research only looked at the impact of non-
malicious behavior caused by disharmony within the research model. This research 
did not consider malicious behavior.  
This research did consider the pressures on employee behavior caused by out 
of balanced constructs in the Synergistic Security Model.  Organizational leaders 
must work toward creating the balance between the pressure to complete job tasks 
and the pressure to ensure information security compliance. 
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 It is important that researchers and practitioners continue to examine methods 
for ensuring users follow information security controls consistently, thereby 
ensuring a more secure information system. 
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